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THE NONREVIEWABILITY OF CONSULAR VISA DECISIONS:
AN UNJUSTIFIED ABERRATION FROM AMERICAN JUSTICE
RUSSELL WOLFF*
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations establishes that the
issuance of visas is a specific responsibility of consular officers.' This
activity has been performed for decades by consuls throughout the
world.' Consular issuance of visas, however, has received extensive crit-
ical examination in the United States, where the nonreviewability of
visa decisions conflicts with recognized standards of fundamental fair-
ness.' Such determinations leave rejected immigration candidates little
or no opportunity to enter this country. In a significant minority of
situations, visa denials reflect nothing more than the caprice of a par-
ticular consular employee. It will be the objective of this article to ana-
lyze the United States system of visa approvals and to explicate the
practicality of alleviating the alleged miscarriages of justice that have
occurred through the adoption of a statutory provision for judicial re-
view. Initially, a brief historical discussion will demonstrate the prob-
lem within the context of federal legislation.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The idea of United States consuls inspecting applicants for immi-
gration was discussed as early as the fiftieth Congress (1887-1888), but
no formal legislation was enacted at that time.4 Specific regulations
* The author is presently a member of the United States Army Judge Advocate
General's Office, stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany.
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, art. 5(d).
2. See E. HARPER & R. CHASE, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 65-67 (3d ed.
1975).
3. See generally Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1975); Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case Study in
Administrative Absolutism, 41 A.B.A. J. 1109 (1955); Note, Developments in the
Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REV. 643, 661-63 (1953).
4. E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 588 (1981).
The first promulgation that involved a consular visa function was actually passed on
August 18, 1856. It provided that a United States consul would be responsible for issuing
a visa any time a foreign government required a United States citizen to possess such a
document. See United States Consular Regulations (1868), discussed in G. STUART,
AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICE 415 (1936).
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were not forthcoming until the House approved a measure introduced
in 1894, which suggested that no alien should gain admission into the
United States without a certificate of approval from a United States
consul.5 In spite of the need to restrict the ever escalating immigration,
the Senate expressly objected to this legislation because a consular visa
approval function was arguably unrecognized in international law.6 In
1896 the issue was discussed again in the House without generating a
consensus.
7
It was not until 1917 that United States consuls acquired the spe-
cific responsibility to issue visas. This grant of authority was the result
of an administrative wartime security measure emanating from the De-
partment of State.8 Three months later, a Joint Order of the Depart-
ments of State and Labor superceded the initial measure, and provided
that "each passport of an alien intending to enter the United States
should be visaed by the American Consulate or the Diplomatic Mission
if specifically authorized," and that alien passports. should not be vi-
saed unless previously certified.9
This administrative decree was given statutory life the following
year for the purpose of regulating entrances and departures from the
United States during World War .'0 A Presidential Order later pre-
scribed that the Secretary of State had final responsibility to supervise
the admission of aliens into the United States.' In 1919, the joint en-
5. 26 CONG. REc. 7756 (1894) (remarks by Rep. Stone), reported in E.P. HUTCHINSON,
supra note 4, at 111.
6. E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at 112.
7. Id. at 115-16. Similarly, in 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt appealed to Con-
gress to approve consular involvement in immigration matters, but no action was taken.
Id. at 588.
8. On April 20, 1917, the State Department informed the Legation at the Hague that
"[aIll persons sailing for this country should be advised to have their passports visaed by
a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States." 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 741 (1942).
9. Joint Order of the Department of State and the Department of Labor, Requiring
Passports and Certain Information from Aliens Who Desire to Enter the United States
During the War (July 26, 1917), reprinted in U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, LAWS
APPLICABLE TO IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 1042 (E. Avery ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited
as Joint Order].
10. Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 223-
26(b)). See E. HARPER & R. CHASE, supra note 2, at 66 n.14.
11. Proclamation No. 1478, Aug. 8, 1918. See Joint Order, supra note 9, at 1046 (U.S.
Laws and Statutes) (an executive order issued the same day proscribed the granting of
visas unless there was "a reasonable necessity" for entering the United States, which was
"not prejudicial to the United States"). Executive Order No. 2932, % 32, Aug. 9, 1918.
See E. HARPER & R. CHASE, supra note 2, at 166.
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actment was temporarily reauthorized, 2 and in 1921 it.was given an
indefinite extension.'"
In May, 1921, the first Quota Act was adopted, establishing annual
limitations on the number of immigrants in excess of which consular
officers could not issue visas. 4 Consuls also could not permit entry to
those prohibited from receiving visas under the wartime measures. 5
Finally, the Immigration Act of 1924 articulated qualitative guidelines
for consular officers to adjudge an alien's acceptability for admission
into the United States."8 These procedures were reaffirmed in the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act of 1952;17 they remain today as the
legislative authorization for the "visa function" performed by United
States consuls.
These various codifications demonstrate that neither administra-
tive nor judicial review is available for consular decisions that deny
visa applications. This view has occurred in spite of legislative history
which suggests that consular nonreviewability is contrary to the origi-
nal expectations.
The initial Joint Order contained a provision which sought to en-
sure that some form of review would always be available."8 Consular
officials were explicitly instructed to issue visas for aliens who could
eventually be excluded upon arrival.19 This was mandated because
aliens have the opportunity for appellate review following exclusion.20
Moreover, the Commissioner-General of Immigration in 1919 directly
emphasized the need for some kind of relief from decisions denying a
visa." Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington, the author of the
1921 extension bill and the 1924 Immigration Act, also indirectly af-
12. Act of Nov. 10, 1919, 41 Stat. 353. This act, however, never took effect. See Ro-
senfield, supra note 3, at 1109 n.6.
13. Act of Mar. 2, 1921, 41 Stat. 1217. See Rosenfield, supra note 3.
14. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 9, 42 Stat. 5. See E. HurcHiNsoN, supra note 4, at 180.
15. See E. HARPER & R. CHASE, supra note 2, at 67.
16. Act of May 26, 1924, § 2, 43 Stat. 153, 8 U.S.C. §§ 201-04, repealed by Act of
June 27, 1952, ch. 477, tit. IV, § 403(a)(23), (24), 66 Stat. 279.
17. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1185 (1982).
18. See Joint Order, supra note 9.
19. The receipt of a visa does not create an automatic right to enter the United
States. An immigration officer at the United States border may unilaterally overrule a
consul's decision to issue the entrance document. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1225 (1982).
20. See Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 1110 n.12.
21. The Commissioner-General adamantly insisted that consular decisions should not
absolutely bar immigration and that their role extended no further than discouraging
unqualified aliens from seeking admission. Each applicant was to decide individually the
wisdom of pursuing immigration with full knowledge that rejection in the United States
would be amenable to review. See AXNuAL REPowr oF THE COMMISSION R-GE ERAL OF
IMMIGRATION FOR 1919, H.R. Doc. No. 422, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 386-87 (1919).
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firmed support for such appellate review. 22 Some avenue for relief was
thus always considered a requisite aspect of consular legislation.
Although these earliest promulgations were designed to maintain
access to official review, this concept was never elucidated in precise
language. Legislators later obscured the intention when they expanded
consular participation in visa authorizations without reference to this
fundamental guarantee.2 3 Consequently, a system of unbridled admin-
istrative discretion emerged from historical roots that were intended to
retain the opportunity of appellate relief. The absence of available re-
view is magnified in the controlling legislation.
CONSULAR VISA POWERS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Current immigration law, as previously noted, is largely contained
within the Immigration and Naturalization Act of June 27, 1952 and
its accompanying amendments.24 The substantive provisions governing
the consuls' role in regulating visa applications have remained largely
undisturbed. The Act stipulates that a visa is necessary for any alien to
enter the United States.26 The issuance of visas is delegated directly to
consular officials;28 however, no procedural process for the review of
denied visa applications is specifically authorized.2 7 Instead, the Act
emphasizes the finality of consular decisions by prescribing that the
Secretary of State may supervise all consular activities, "except those
powers, duties and functions conferred upon the consular officers relat-
ing to the granting or refusal of visas."'28 Even where a consul has acted
arbitrarily or capriciously nonreviewability would prevail.2 9
Although the Act does not explicitly preclude judicial review, two
early appellate decisions have been utilized as a basis for rejecting its
22. He emphasized that consular agents could not "refuse applications for vis6s to
persons for even apparent defects that would be certain to cause them to fail to get into
the United States after arriving at our gates." Opportunities for review would in all cases
be preserved. 60 CONG. REc. 3811 (1921) (remarks by Rep. Johnson).
23. Several bills drafted in the 1920's to ensure some form of review failed to secure
confirmation. See E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at 227, 230.
24. See supra note 17.
25. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181(a), 1101(a)(16) (1982).
26. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1201 (1982).
27. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1201 (1982).
28. Id. For a discussion of this provision, see generally Rosenfield, Necessary Admin-
istrative Reforms in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REv.
145, 151-52 (1958); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 146 (1953) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
29. See U.S. ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276
U.S. 630 (1928). See also U.S. ex rel. Gruber v. Karnuth, 29 F.2d 314 (D.C.N.Y. 1928),
aff'd, 30 F.2d 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 850 (1929).
[Vol. 5
CONSULAR VISA DECISIONS
availability. In United States ex rel London v. Phelps,3 0 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the case of a British subject
who attempted to enter the United States via Canada to temporarily
visit her children. Although her visa application had been refused, she
entered this country and was detained at a United States immigration
station."1 The court, upon a writ of habeas corpus, upheld the require-
ment of a visa for entry into the United States based upon the validity
of an Executive Order issued in 1925." In conclusion the court added:
Whether the consul has acted reasonably or unreasonably is
not for us to determine. Unjustifiable refusal to visa a passport
may be ground for diplomatic complaint by the nation whose
subject has been discriminated against. It is beyond the juris-
diction of the Court.
33
The following year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia decided a case in which a United States citizen sought permis-
sion for his alien German spouse to enter the United States. In United
States ex rel Ulrich v. Kellogg,"' the alien's visa application was re-
fused because she had committed four offenses involving moral turpi-
tude, i.e., three cases of larceny and abetting a forgery.3 5 Her husband
appealed to the court to direct the consul to issue a visa on the ground
that their marriage altered her alienage.3 6 The court, citing the so-
called Cable Act,3 7 held that marriage did not automatically naturalize
a spouse and that as an alien, plaintiff's wife was subject to exclusion.3 8
Once again, the court found that the power to grant a visa was given to
consular officers and that no "provision of the immigration laws . . .
provides for an official review of the action of the consular officers in
each case by a cabinet officer or other authority."' 9
Although these two cases became the central authority for the pro-
position that judicial review is not available for consular visa action," a
30. 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 630 (1928).
31. Id. at 289.
32. Id. at 290.
33. Id.
34. 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 868 (1929).
35. Id. at 985.
36. Id.
37. Act of Sept. 22, 1922, Pub. L. No. 346, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021-22.
38. 30 F.2d at 985, 986.
39. Id. at 986.
40. E.g., Burratato v. United States Dep't of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 n.2 (2d Cir.
1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976); Loza-Bedoya v. I.N.S., 410 F.2d 343,
347 (9th Cir. 1969); Estrada v. Aherns, 296 F.2d 690, 692 n.2 (5th Cit. 1961) (dictum);
Sague v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 217, 219, 221 (D.P.R. 1976); Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod,
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closer examination of those holdings indicates that such a conclusion is
inappropriate. In London, the court's only concern was with the need
to obtain a visa prior to entering the United States and the validity of
United States regulations mandating such a result. Only as an after-
thought, and clearly as dicta, did the court in two of the last three
sentences of the opinion mention the issue of visa nonreviewability.
Similarly, in Ulrich, the court never directly addressed the question of
judicial review, but merely noted that no administrative procedures
existed to challenge a visa determination. Consequently, a legal truism
became entrenched without legitimate theoretical underpinnings.4 1
A more recent United States Supreme Court case, Kliendienst v.
Mande 1,42 presents modern authority for the doctrine of
nonreviewability of consular decisions.43 In that case, a suit was filed to
compel the Attorney General to issue a temporary nonimmigrant visa
to the Belgian scholar and Marxist activist, Ernest Mandel." As an
alien, he was denied the visa on the grounds that he "advocated and
published the economic, international and governmental doctrines of
world communism. '45 On two previous occasions the Attorney General
had waived Mandel's ineligibility, but he refused to permit this partic-
ular visit.4 Deferring to the Attorney General's discretion, the Court
stated that Congress possessed absolute power to regulate the entrance
of aliens, and in this case, had granted authority to the Executive.47 In
response to that delegation, the Court would not interfere with the At-
torney General's inaction regardless of the competing first amendment
193 F. Supp. 577, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
41. For a more extensive discussion of these cases and their progeny, see Note, Judi-
cial Review of Visa Denials: Reexamining Consular Nonreviewability, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1137, 1142-50 (1977).
42. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
43. E.g., Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518, 519 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 897 (1976); Wan Shih Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1978); Ubiera v.
Bell, 463 F. Supp. 181, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762,
764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grullon v. Kissinger, 417 F. Supp. 337, 338-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1976);
Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182, 1186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Of the above cited cases
the one most directly on point is Gomez, in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a one sentence summary judgment which had held that "[tihis court lacks ju-
risdiction to review the acts of American consular officials abroad in determining
whether or not to issue a visa." Gomez, 534 F.2d at 518. They responded with a per
curiam opinion which cited Mandel and stated that "the decisions of the Supreme Court
... preclude any judicial review of the consular decision not to issue a visa in this case."
Id. at 519. See also Lukaszuk v. Haig, 523 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
44. 408 U.S. at 756.
45. Id. at 755 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D), (G)(v) (1982)).
46. Id. at 756.
47. Id. at 766-67.
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concerns. 4  Quoting Justice Harlan in Lem Moon Sing v. United
States,49 the Court held:
The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the
United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon
which they may come to this country, or to have its declared
policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive of-
ficers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous
adjudications."0
This case, furthermore, does not directly support the blanket pro-
position that judicial review is unavailable for consular decisions. The
factual circumstances in the Mandel adjudication did not involve a
consular visa denial. The singular issue addressed was the propriety of
the Attorney General's use of the waiver power in refusing to permit
the entry of Ernest Mandel. The broad application of Mandel to con-
sular officers would seem to constitute an abuse of precedential author-
ity.5 1 Despite the questionable foundations of the doctrine, the fact re-
mains that the judiciary will not review consular visa decisions.
THE EXISTENCE OF INTERNAL CONSULAR REVIEW5
Some form of limited internal review has been established to miti-
gate the negative effects of consular absolutism. While the Secretary of
State is precluded from expressly invoking authority in the visa appli-
cation process, 3 guidelines have been promulgated to mandate adher-
ence and direct consular behavior. 4 Primarily, these guidelines eluci-
48. Id. at 765, 768.
49. 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).
50. 408 U.S. at 766.
51. See generally Note, supra note 41, at 1148-50.
52. It is outside the scope of this article to elucidate the entire visa application pro-
cess. For a thorough discussion of the procedure, see generally 1A C. GORDON & H. Ro-
SENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.7b (rev. ed. 1983); Comment, How to
Immigrate to the United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 193, 197-207 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, How to Immigrate]. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that consular officers do not conduct formal hearings for immigra-
tion candidates and that the burden of proof to establish eligibility for entry remains
with the applicants. See Steiner, Misrepresentation and Materiality in Immigration
Law-Scouring the Melting Pot, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 477-79 (1980); Gordon, Final-
ity of Immigration and Nationality Determinations-Can the Government be Es-
topped?, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 436 (1964). See also Comment, Aliens-Temporary
Trainee Visas -Unification Church v. Attorney General, 3 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 119,
128 (1979).
53. See supra text accompanying note 28.
54. 22 C.F.R. § 42 (1983).
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date the grounds upon which a visa application may be refused."
Unfortunately, these provisions have proven inadequate and are rou-
tinely disregarded.60 Moreover, since the guidelines often prescribe
amorphous considerations for deciding whether to reject a visa applica-
tion, there is no decrease in discretionary decisionmaking5
In addition to the theoretical protection provided by these criteria,
aliens may request reconsideration of a visa denial." Immigration can-
didates must be notified of the reasons for an unauthorized visa and of
any further relief that is available.59 An applicant also receives a one
hundred and twenty day grace period in which to accumulate addi-
tional or supplementary documentation to support a reversal."
While this system appears most efficacious,61 its application is seri-
ously flawed. An alien, for example, has no right to examine the ad-
verse evidence that supported the original rejection.2  Moreover,
through selective classification of information, a consular agent can re-
fuse to supply an applicant with a statement of the facts upon which
the denial was based.63 Finally, the inordinate number of reversals re-
sulting from the presentation of additional evidence serves to implicate
the very system upon which decisions are made.
Countless worthy candidates, thus, are denied admission for rea-
sons wholly unrelated to their qualifications (e.g., an inability to locate
sufficient supporting documentation). While many are apparently able
to overcome this burden, it would seem undeniable that many others
are not. Absent adequate review, these persons are unjustly prevented
from immigrating to the United States.
Two additional types of internal review are also authorized. The
55. See generally Anderson & Gifford, Consular Discretion in the Immigrant Visa-
Issuing Process, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 76, 102-13 (1978).
56. Id. at 153.
57. As one author notes,
[d]epartmental guidelines are often vague and ill-defined. Different consular of-
ficers and consulates interpret the law, the regulations, and the guidelines in
vastly dissimilar ways. Indeed, two officers may reach opposite determinations
on the same question of fact and law. The system of checking these determina-
tions is inadequate to ensure the uniform application of the law.
Id. at 152.
58. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 52, § 3.8c at 3-124.
59. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.130(a), 42.130(a) (1983) (concerning refusal and revocation of
nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, respectively).
60. Id. § 41.130(b).
61. One tabulation indicates that nearly one-half of all visas originally denied in 1975
were later granted following the presentation of further supporting information. See An-
derson & Gifford, supra note 55, at 105 n.103.
62. D. CARLINER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS 37 (1977).
63. Id.
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principal consular officer of a post reviews all rejected visas. If the
principal officer agrees with the decision to refuse a visa, the denial is
final and the case is closed." On the other hand, if the superior officer
disagrees with the original judgment, two alternatives are available: ei-
ther to assume personal responsibility for the case, or to refer the ap-
plication to the State Department for an "advisory opinion." ' 5
While in theory this procedure appears highly commendable, in
practice its utility is almost nonexistent. Initially, the scope of review is
very modest. Almost no explanatory information justifying the prelimi-
nary determination is given to the principal officer." Moreover, those
undertaking the review are either inadequately trained in the area of
visa application review or lack independence from those officials for-
mulating the original decision. Thus, refusals often receive pro forma
acceptances or are returned with only cursory comments., In some in-
stances, no action is taken at all." Finally, an applicant does not have
access to this appellate process and cannot refute unjustified conclu-
sions made by the initial decision-rendering officer.69 The efficacy of
this internal review is therefore limited.
An alternative process of review may occur when the principal of-
ficer chooses to elicit an advisory opinion from the United States State
Department. The Department of State, through its Visa Office, also
may intervene unilaterally and issue an advisory opinion upon the re-
quest of a congressperson, an applicant, an attorney, or any other indi-
vidual with a genuine interest in the case."0 These opinions involve ei-
ther a legal interpretation or the application of law to a particular set
of facts.
7 1
Although typically consular officers will abide by State Depart-
ment advisory opinions,72 formally these opinions are binding only as
to questions of law.7" If a consulate agent ignores the State Depart-
ment's suggested application of the law to the facts, however, the agent
must submit a statement explaining the rationale for his decision.
7 4
64. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.130(b), 42.130(b) (1983).
65. Id. §§ 41.130(c), 42.130(c).
66. See Anderson & Gifford, supra note 55, at 108.
67. Id.; 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.130(c), 42.130(c) (1983). In the latter situation the original
decision is typically altered.
68. See Anderson & Gifford, supra note 55, at 108.
69. Id. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 149.
70. See E. HARPER & R. CHASE, supra note 2, at 483.
71. See Note, supra note 41, at 1140.
72. See Bacon, Ideological Restrictions on Immigration, 8 U. CAL. S.D. L. REV. 217,
219 (1975); Comment, How to Immigrate, supra note 52, at 206-07.
73. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.130(c), 42.130(c) (1983).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982). Evidently, in some unusual circumstances, the State De-
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Again, although this procedure appears acceptable on its face, it is
replete with deficiencies in practice. Principally, only the most uncom-
mon cases are actually reviewed by the Visa Office." Consular officers
lack trust in the Visa Office; it is frequently perceived as too far re-
moved from actual circumstances and lacking in applicable experience
to be of substantive assistance.7 Moreover, the Visa Office has no es-
tablished procedure for review and relies upon unpublished internal
instructions to its staff.77 An alien has no opportunity to appear before
the appropriate officers, and the Office only occasionally has access to
all the relevant data.78 In addition, the opinions are "advisory," so a
consul is not bound to repudiate an initial decision.
In practice, therefore, the internal consular review process is al-
most nonexistent. The insubstantial record generated during an inter-
view largely precludes effective scrutiny. Neither consular nor State
Department personnel seem to have the resources, the incentive or the
collegial understanding to oversee responsibly the discretionary deter-
minations of consular officers. 79 Consequently, the need for a mecha-
nism of conscientious and impartial review is great.
THE CASE FOR ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Before proposing a statutory solution to the problems of consular
nonreviewability, three preliminary issues must be discussed. First,
should the receipt of a visa be viewed as constituting either a privilege
or a right? If the former, the retention of broad-based consular discre-
tion is easier to defend. Second, what is the extent of the actual hard-
ship that results from the present system of nonreviewability? If the
suffering is limited, the need to institute a system of review is reduced.
Third, does the Administrative Procedure Act s provide an adequate
statutory basis upon which to authorize judicial review? If its presence
is sufficient, no additional legislation is warranted.
partment could even reassign a particular visa case to a different officer. See Kiley, The
Rights of Aliens in the Visa Process, Part I, 51 INTERPRETER RELEASES 149, 153 (1974).
75. See Anderson & Gifford, supra note 55, at 106-08 (if the reviewing officer does
not concur in the refusal, he must refer the case to the Visa Office for an advisory opin-
ion or take jurisdiction of the case himself. Apparently the practice of requesting an
advisory opinion is a seldom utilized procedure).
76. See generally id. at 110-13.
77. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 149, 150.
78. Id.
79. After surveying the severe shortcomings in the present review system, one com-
mentator concluded that "it does not seem surprising that most officers deny that the
prospect of review affects their determinations." See Anderson & Gifford, supra note 55,
at 112.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1976).
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The Senate Judiciary Committee Report preceding the enactment
of the landmark 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act addressed
the first inquiry, stressing that a "right" to a visa was a misnomer and,
correspondingly, an appeal from a visa denial was not required.8 ' The
report stated that
to allow an appeal from a consul's denial of a visa would be to
make a judicial determination of a right when, in fact, a right
does not exist. An alien has no right to come to the United
States and the refusal of a visa is not an invasion of his
rights.8 2
This declaration is irrefutable, and has been repeatedly affirmed
by the courts, 3 reflecting an undeniable aspect of territorial sover-
eignty. The author contends that it is likewise irrelevant to the need
for consular decision review.
If the United States desired to legislatively preclude the admission
of all aliens, such behavior would be constitutionally legitimate.8 ' Since
the United States, however, has acknowledged that the exclusion of all
aliens is unjustifiable as well as disadvantageous, a statutory right
should be created to assure that the process of acceptance conforms
with American standards of justice and equity. As one authority testi-
fied during the House hearings for the 1952 Act:
It has become a fundamental premise of our jurisprudence that
the decision of weighty matters should almost never be placed
in the power of a single individual free from the control of a
superior reviewing body. We search in vain for any parallel in
our institutions for this despotic consular absolutism. Rela-
tively few decisions even of Federal judges are free from the
possibility of appellate revision. But the consul is not only im-
mune from review but from any other kind of check, even of
81. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF
THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 622 (1950).
82. Id.
83. In Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1949), for example, the Supreme
Court stated that "[wihatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." Exclusion of aliens is not subject to due
process attacks because without a vested right of entry the matter is one of privilege to
be granted or withheld as a matter of executive discretion. Id. at 542-44.
84. Moreover, it would be within the prescriptions of public international law which
do not obligate a state to accept asylees, much less immigrants. See Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR Doc. 1/777, art. 14 (1948). For the
travaux pr~paratoires of this article, see 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (121st mtg.) at 331, A/C.3/
SR.121 (1948) (statement of Mr. Baroody).
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publicity. If there is such a thing as an axiom of law, it is that
where there is power there must be safeguards against the
abuse of power . . . . [i]t is indefensible to give to any man,
acting in secret in a remote land, autocratic power to grant or
withhold a privilege of such enormous value as that of entrance
to this country. 5
The nonexistence of a specified right to immigrate does not dimin-
ish the obligation to provide due process protections when such an op-
portunity is extended. A legal system founded upon equitable princi-
ples cannot accommodate a process that removes procedural
guarantees from a select, highly vulnerable minority."
As for the second issue, it is not possible to accurately determine
the precise number of aliens who have been unjustly deprived of an
opportunity to enter the United States. 7 It should be emphasized,
however, that while only a statistically small percentage of visa appli-
cations are dismissed annually, 88 the number of rejected candidates
may reach the tens of thousands.89 Given the various discretionary
grounds upon which visa applications are refused, it is incontrovertible
that a significant minority of these applicants are treated unjustly.
Consular officers may not arbitrarily deny visa applications or in-
terpose their own subjective judgments into the decisionmaking pro-
cess.90 The statute provides thirty-three broadly stated legislative
85. Hearings before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1575, 1578 (1952) (statement of
Professors Louis L. Jaffe and Henry M. Hart) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. See
also H.R. REP. No. 1193, pt. 2, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
86. It should also be noted that the trend in United States constitutional law is to de-
emphasize the privilege-right dichotomy as an anomaly with little legal vitality. See gen-
erally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968). Courts now focus primarily upon statutory entitle-
ment. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1969). This type of consideration
would seem particularly applicable to an analysis of the "rights" of non-resident aliens.
Since the capacity to immigrate is statutorily enshrined in United States law, the just
enforcement of such laws should be ensured.
87. For a specific case study, see Weisskopf, Report on the Visa Situation, 8 BULL.
ATOM. Sci. 221 (1952).
88. See Kiley, supra note 74, at 152.
89. BUREAU OF SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE
VISA OFFICE 1, 76 (1975). Moreover, particular consuls seem to reject excessive numbers
of applicants. For example, between July 1976 and June 1977, the Monterrey, Mexico
consulate refused to grant 14,210 visas. See Anderson & Gifford, supra note 55, at 111
n.156.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1) (1982). This notion has been similarly stated by the courts.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gruber v. Karnuth, 29 F.2d 314, 316 (D.C. N.Y. 1928).
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grounds upon which an alien can be found inadmissible."' These in-
clude mental retardation, drug addiction and illiteracy, as well as hav-
ing committed a crime involving moral turpitude or attempting to
enter the country under circumstances of fraud.92 The Immigration
and Naturalization Act stipulates that consular officers may deny a
visa when there is "reason to believe" an applicant is ineligible under
one of the legislatively mandated criteria.'5 Although this language was
designed to impose a reasonable person standard, 9" the ambiguous na-
ture of these guidelines leaves considerable room for consular
discretion.
One category precluding admission addresses applicants "who in
the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa
are likely at any time to become public charges." 5 The imprecision of
this language is apparent, since a prospective estimation reflecting con-
tingencies beyond the capacity of presently ascertainable knowledge is
required. 6 An individual consular agent must determine not only the
level of income necessary for survival, but also an alien's prospects for
attaining and maintaining such a standard. In addition, the legislature
has failed to define the parameters of "public charge." Such wide dis-
cretion offers an agent undue opportunities for abuse. These interpre-
tative complexities are compounded by the fact that consulate officers
are merely individuals, plagued by such frailties of human nature as
prejudice and mistaken judgment.'7
Several additional factors also improperly influence consular deci-
sions. Traditionally, a limited amount of time is allotted to reflect upon
visa applications. Operating under significant time constraints, consu-
lar agents are unable to conscientiously consider each individual candi-
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(33) (1982).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 22 C.F.R. § 42.60 (1983).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1982) (emphasis added). One study in Mexico found that
sixty-one percent of all initial refusals were based on this category. See Anderson & Gif-
ford, supra note 55, at 113. In 1982, 20,796 applicants were initially refused immigrant
visas because of their inability to satisfy the public-charge criteria. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10,
1983, at A17, col. 6.
96. Officers apparently look at bank and insurance statements, employment pros-
pects, affidavits of support and posted bonds to make this determination. See Anderson
& Gifford, supra note 55, at 114; Comment, How to Immigrate, supra note 52, at 201-06.
97. This statement is not meant to denigrate the integrity or competence of anyone
serving as a consular agent. Rather, it simply reflects normal human inadequacies. Sev-
eral writers have emphasized that one may assume consular officers represent an espe-
cially honest and ethical class without altering this contention. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 147; Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 1112.
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date.98 Similarly, inadequate resources vex most consulates.99 Finally,
the very nature of the process frequently involves complicated ques-
tions of foreign law, national security, political and social developments
and other technical peculiarities. Consular employees confronted with
these issues are typically junior and subordinate officers who lack the
experience and precise knowledge requisite for such determinations.' 0
Exacerbating the challenge of accurately classifying visa candidates,'
these numerous, complex variables support the contention that the
very nature of the visa decision process inherently results in arbitrary
rejection of a significant minority of immigration candidates.
The third issue of consequence is the availability of judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Administrative Proce-
dure Act was adopted on June 11, 1946 for the express purpose of codi-
fying the standard of judicial review for administrative decisions.'0 2
Specifically, section 10 proclaims that a "person. . .adversely affected
or aggrieved by an agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute is entitled to judicial review thereof."'0 3 While this language on its
face mandates judicial review of consular decisions, the application of
the Administrative Procedure Act is predicated upon a determination
that judicial scrutiny is not precluded by one of the two exceptions to
the Act.
Initially, the Administrative Procedure Act may not be utilized
when the specific statute proscribes, either expressly or by implication,
98. One author notes that at some posts, visa issuing officers average twenty-five to
thirty-five interviews per day with only five to fifteen minutes allowed per interview. See
Anderson & Gifford, supra note 55, at 216 n.201.
99. Id. at 116.
100. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 148.
101. The Immigration and Naturalization Act does provide for some form of relief if
consular officers go beyond their authority and reject a visa application. It reiterates a
provision initially adopted in 1856 which states that, "whenever any consul officer . . . is
guilty of any willful malfeasance or abuse of power, or any corrupt conduct in his office,
he shall be liable to all persons injured . . . for all damages occasioned thereby ...." 22
U.S.C. § 1199, repealed by Act of Aug. 17, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-105, tit. I, § 111(a)(1), 91
Stat. 848. Unfortunately, this is wholly inadequate as it requires knowledge on the part
of visa applicants of the consular officer's specific action. Moreover, it necessitates inten-
tional wrongdoing on the part of consuls, whereas much of the injustice reflects innocent
or subconscious misuse of discretion. Consequently, the section has had little effect. See
Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1934). Since it is an existing legal
mechanism, however, opportunities should be pursued to expand its possible usefulness.
102. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Court concluded
that the Administrative Procedure Act "embodies the basic presumption of judicial re-
view" for a broad spectrum of administrative actions. Id. at 140.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
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access to appellate review."' A presumption exists, however, that "an
administrative act is subject to judicial review unless there is a persua-
sive reason to believe Congress decided to deny review."'' 5 An exami-
nation of the travaux pr~paratoires is necessary, therefore, to deter-
mine the relevant congressional intent.
In the hearings that preceded adoption of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952, the issue of judicial review received sur-
prisingly little direct discussion. The testimony did, however, indicate
an intent to prohibit judicial review.'O' The idea of an explicit provi-
sion for review of consular decisions appears to have arisen on only one
occasion, when an amendment was proposed to create a Visa Review
Board within the Department of State.'0 7 The justification offered for
the amendment was that the Immigration and Naturalization Act gave
"the consular officer in every small place or large place in the world
• . . absolute and untrammeled jurisdiction to deny an[y] alien a visa
.. . ,108 Upon hearing this explanation, one congressperson arose in
objection and exclaimed,
. . . under the provisions of this amendment it would permit
every alien to have his case brought to this country for final
disposition. He could go before the visa review board, he could
then take an appeal to the courts, and we would be clogged up
for months and months with these matters. It would mean ad-
ditional Federal judges.1"9
Following this declaration, the amendment was promptly re-
jected.' This reflex repudiation of administrative review on the
grounds that it might lead to excessive judicial involvement provides
strong evidence that Congress did not intend to make judicial scrutiny
available. Most assuredly, if Congress was unwilling to permit judicial
review directly, Congress would not have been amenable to its indirect
availability through the Administrative Procedure Act.
Moreover, in attacking the adoption of the Immigration and Natu-
104. Id. § 701(a)(1).
105. Graham v. Caston, 568 F.2d 1092, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1978).
106. The district court in Knoetze v. United States established the evidentiary stan-
dard necessary to demonstrate the nonapplicability of the Administrative Procedure Act
to an administrative decision, stating, "[d]efendants ... bear the heavy burden of over-
coming the presumption of reviewability by presenting convincing evidence that it was
the intent of Congress to preclude review." 472 F. Supp. 201, 205 (S.D. Fla. 1979), aff'd,
634 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981).
107. 98 CONG. REc. 4430 (1952) (statement of Rep. Javits).
108. Id. at 4431.
109. Id. (statement of Rep. Graham).
110. Id.
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ralization Act, many members of Congress referred to the
nonreviewability of consular decisions as one of its greatest deficien-
cies."' Senator Lehman of New York, for example, noted while dis-
cussing one of the exemptions to admission that "[tihis is one of many
blanket provisions in the .. .bill which authorizes any consul to bar
anybody. . . And there is no appeal from a consul's decision ...
[R]easonable and recognizable standards should be established, and, in
the case of necessary discretion, provision must be made for review."11
If, in fact, the Administrative Procedure Act was intended to apply,
fear of arbitrary consular activity would never have been so extensive.
Finally, even though there had been much discussion of the utility
of the Administrative Procedure Act within the context of deportation
and exclusion hearings, it was not addressed in the context of visa de-
nials.11 3 In fact, both the House and Senate sponsors of the bill had
insisted that the Administrative Procedure Act would apply to depor-
tation hearings.1 1 4 When an amendment was drafted to authorize un-
impeded applicability of the Act to immigration issues, however, it was
severely criticized.,1 5 The Senate sponsor of the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Act attacked this concept by proclaiming that
the substitute amendment. . . would have the effect of shack-
ling the officials who are charged with the enforcement of our
immigration and naturalization laws. . . . [T]he substitute
amendment contains a sweeping provision that the provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act shall be applicable to all
proceedings relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens.
1 6
In light of the above, although Congress was hesitant to extend the
Act to deportation proceedings, it clearly did not intended to exclude
consular decisions concerning visas from the Act. Numerous individu-
als testifying before the House in 1952 lamented its absence from the
Immigration Act." 7
111. See, e.g., id. at 5778 (statement of Sen. Moody), 5779 (statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
112. Id. at 5114 (statement of Sen. Lehman).
113. See generally id. at 5778-89.
114. Id. at 4415, 4416 (statement of Rep. Walter), 5778 (statement of Sen.
McCarran).
115. The amendment simply stated that "[tihe provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act shall be applicable to all proceedings relating to the exclusion or explusion of
aliens." Id. at 5428 (introduced by Sen. Lehman).
116. Id. at 5625 (remarks of Sen. McCarran).
117. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 85, at 17 (statement of Edward J. Ennis),
518 (statement of Edward A. Brown), 545 (statement of Borris Joffe), 1566 (statement of
John Cragun).
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This evidence led the President's Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization to conclude that "the Immigration and Naturalization
Act of 1952 does not directly deal with the Administrative Procedure
Act. . . .However, other directives of the statute force a pattern which
reveals an unmistakable purpose to exempt immigration hearings from
the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. '" 8
The federal courts have similarly shared this judgment." 9 Conse-
quently, congressional intent has been interpreted to exempt the provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act from the consular visa de-
terminations authorized by the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 20
A STATUTORY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF VISA DENIALS
Given the shortcomings inherent in the status quo, the need exists
to formulate a remedial statute. 2' The following draft enactment is
suggested.'22
li8. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 159.
119. In Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, the court noted:
To allow plaintiff a hearing and adjudication of his eligibility for citizenship
would completely circumvent the provisions of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1952 granting exclusively to consuls the right to issue visas .... This
is certainly not what Congress intended in the statute, and the court cannot here
undermine the statutory scheme and allow defendant by this proceeding to re-
view the consul's action.
193 F. Supp. 577, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
120. The second situation where the Administrative Procedure Act is inapplicable
becomes irrelevant given the explicit congressional intent. This exception, however,
would not be satisfied since it removes the Act's jurisdiction from adminsitrative deci-
sions that are "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)( 2 ) (1982). This
is to be considered only when "there is no law to apply." See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). In the review of consular decisions,
there would certainly be sufficient "law to apply." As previously mentioned, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act stipulates thirty-two contingencies upon which visa ap-
plications may be legitimately denied. Moreover, an extensive amount of case law has
developed concerning the issues of deportation and exclusion which could provide a basis
for interpreting ambiguous statutory language. See Note, supra note 41, at 1162. Thus,
absent clear congressional language to the contrary, there would be no legal rationale to
ignore the Administrative Procedure Act's amenability to consular visa decisionmaking.
121. Several judicial opinions have demonstrated the need for congressional action
before the idea of review would be acceptable. See, e.g., Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F.
Supp. at 577.
122. The author recognizes that certain aspects of this promulgation would be con-
sidered controversial and politically explosive. It is the author's intention to posit legisla-
tive language that would alleviate the magnitude of the inequalities that adhere to a
system of nonreviewability. As a draft statute, however, the wording is open to
modification.
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Judicial Review of Consular Visa Denials23
1. Judicial review may be pursued by all aliens whose visa appli-
cations have been rejected by a United States consular officer. This
opportunity for appeal is subject to all existing constitutional
stipulations.
2. All avenues of internal agency review must be exhausted prior
to the pursuit of relief in the courts. Following a final confirmation of
the consul's original rejection, the applicant shall receive written notice
explaining the reason for denial and the opportunity to file a judicial
appeal. The court remedy shall be called a writ for judicial review.
3. An applicant must file the writ within thirty days. after receipt
of notification that the final internal administrative remedy has proven
unsuccessful. If no action is taken within that time, the decision of the
consul is final.
4. The actual writ shall be filed within the United States by a
family member, employer, or other third person who can document an
injury in fact resulting from the visa denial.
5. Writs for review are to be brought in the United States district
courts. Such suits shall be instituted in the district of the plaintiff's
residence or place of business, as is appropriate.
6. A system of expedited consideration shall be adopted, modeled
after the proceedings utilized for habeas corpus petitions.
7. This single review shall be the exclusive remedy. All decisions
are final and subject to res judicata.
8. The consular officer must submit the complete record explicat-
ing his decision to refuse authorization of a visa. This record, however,
shall not constitute the only source of evidence. The applicant has the
right to produce any relevant material that tends to refute the deter-
mination of the officer. Moreover, the court will retain avenues for pro-
curing additional factual information.
9. The court shall address exclusively issues of law and concepts
of fundamental fairness, and shall not reconsider the facts of the
controversy.
10. A judicial finding that a consular officer erred in the applica-
tion of legal and equitable principles shall result in a mandatory order
to issue a visa.
11. A narrow category of exceptions shall be drawn to preclude
the filing of writs for judicial review where no genuine issue of dispute
exists in a case.
123. Many ideas for this statute were gleaned from the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 28, at 169-70. See also House Hearings, supra note 85, at 1583-84 (statement
of Louis L. Jaffe & Henry M. Hart), 1834-36 (statement of Henry Heineman).
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12. The provisions of this statute shall be interpreted consist-
ently with the language of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952 and where inconsistent shall be given precedence.
Commentary: 1. Consistent with the desire to maintain Ameri-
can standards of justice, and with the concomitant distrust of any sys-
tem of administrative absolutism, 2 " an opportunity for judicial review
of consular decisions is adopted. As previously demonstrated, courts
have been disinclined to independently establish this remedy and have
relied upon judicial precedent that has failed to address squarely the
abnormality of consular nonreviewability.12 Furthermore, the available
legislative history indicates the nonapplicability of the Administrative
Procedure Act to the relevant provisions of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Act.1 26 A statutory remedy is thus imperative.
2. Three procedures have been articulated through which the in-
ternal review of a rejected visa may be pursued: (a) a direct appeal to
the consular agent; (b) a reanalysis by the principal consular officer
and (c) an advisory opinion from the Department of State.12 1 More im-
portantly, all of these avenues have been identified as hopelessly inade-
quate, 2 ' but they are by no means worthless and should not be dis-
missed.12 9 Following an initial rejection, each visa applicant should
initiate the process of internal review. At the conclusion of these proce-
dures, the original consular agent will directly contact the applicant
with information of the decision.3  If a visa is refused, the specific le-
124. As one commentator has stated:
We do not think it is proper for any one man, for anybody-and this is no reflec-
tion at all upon the consul; we are not reflecting or impugning the consul-but
we think no man, whether judge of a district court of the United States or an
internal revenue officer or officer in any responsible position of the Government,
or any subordinate official, should have the right to make a decision which is not
reviewable.
Review of the Action of Consular Officers in Refusing Immigration Visas: Hearings on
H.R. 8878 Before the Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1932) (statement of Isodore Hershfield).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 30-51.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 106-20.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60, 64-65, 70-74.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63, 66-69, 75-78.
129. See supra note 61. Moreover, the very possibility of judicial reversal will likely
enhance the efficacy of these proceedings and encourage more conscientious determina-
tions within the agency structure.
130. Arguably, there should exist some early communication with an applicant to in-
dicate a likely visa denial by a consular officer. This communication could be accompa-
nied by a request for further information if the desire to immigrate remains. See House
Hearings, supra note 85, at 1835 (statement of Henry Heineman). The author, however,
is afraid that this may become overly burdensome and unnecessarily duplicative since
there will be opportunities to present additional illuminating details during the review
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gal provision upon which the denial is based shall be articulated. This
requirement of specificity should in itself reduce the capricious behav-
ior of consuls. The notification of rejection shall not only clearly ex-
plain that the primary responsibility for issuing visas resides with con-
suls, but also that a court will reverse the internal agency decision only
in an exceptional case, based on a prominent deficiency in the applica-
tion of legal and equitable principles. This is not meant to intimidate
or harass a visa applicant, but only to clarify the role of the judiciary
and to discourage frivolous appeals. 1 ' Specific questions regarding the
filing of a writ for review shall be directed to the consul.
3. A relatively limited amount of time is allotted for a rejected
applicant to file a writ for judicial review. This time limit is devised to
enhance the degree of speed and finality of determinations-concepts
often considered important attributes in a system of adjudicating re-
lief. The designation of a thirty day period is an arbitrary selection
which can readily be extended to sixty or ninety days if proved
advantageous.' 2
4. A key section of the legislative draft addresses the troublesome
question of standing to bring writs for review. It would seem largely
axiomatic that a non-resident alien while residing abroad lacks the req-
uisite attributes to qualify for standing before federal courts. 33 This
does not mean, however, that standing cannot constitutionally exist.
The procedures through which standing could be established are delin-
eated in this draft.
The test for standing to receive judicial review by a federal court
of an agency determination has been expressly defined. A petitioner
must allege that "the challenged action had caused [an] injury in fact
. .. to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
procedures. If it is believed, however, that such a "show cause" order as to why a visa
should not be denied would be efficacious in reducing the number of reviews, such an
amendment to the draft statute should be considered.
131. See generally id. at 1583 (statements of Louis L. Jaffe and Henry M. Hart).
132. A proposed draft statute for the judicial review of deportations authorized a
sixty day filing period. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 169.
133. See, e.g., Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Chinese American
Civic Council v. Attorney General, 396 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1975). But cf. Estrada v.
Aherns, 296 F.2d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 1961) ("A person may be just as affected or ag-
grieved" by agency action if he is a nonresident and absent from the country as he would
be if he were a resident and present; it depends on the case); Mukadam v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 458 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("the courts properly confined
themselves to ruling on the narrower ground that an employer's interest alone was suffi-
cient to justify standing") (emphasis added). See also the decision of the trial court in
Mandel, 325 F. Supp. 620, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), which held that an alien had standing
regarding "the effort to exclude him on a ground that denies citizens of this country their
primary rights to hear ... and debate with him."
[Vol. 5
CONSULAR VISA DECISIONS
tected or regulated' by the statutes that the agency. . . was claimed to
have violated."' 3 4 By emphasizing the need to show an injury in fact,
the Supreme Court avoided requiring an injury to a "legal right.' 3 5
Given the previous analysis which indicates the absence of a specific
right to the receipt of a visa, the focus upon an injury in fact preserves
the potential availability of standing to sue. The courts have held that
the necessary injury does occur to certain parties.'"6
Potential employers, for example, have been found to possess the
requisite aspects for standing to sue over visa denials. In Pesikoff v.
Secretary of Labor, 7 the court held that a Houston child psychiatrist
(Dr. Pesikoff) could seek judicial review of a denial of a labor certifica-
tion and the simultaneous refusal to grant a visa to a Mexican citizen
(Ms. Quientero) whom he desired to hire as a live-in maid. The court
concluded:
First, if Dr. Pesikoff is correct in alleging that he cannot find
an American worker who is able to perform the domestic tasks
which Ms. Quientero has contracted to perform, he has clearly
suffered an "injury in fact" . . . Second, this injury is to an
interest-that of American employers in obtaining qualified
employees-arguably within the zone of interest to be pro-
tected . . . .'
Since this type of analysis has been repeatedly affirmed by the
courts," the draft statute identifies prospective employers as one cate-
gory of persons who may have standing to file the writ for review on
behalf of aliens.
Courts have similarly found that resident aliens possess standing
to seek relief from visa denials for their spouses. In Pena v. Kis-
singer,14 0 the court confronted a situation in which plaintiff, a lawful
permanent resident, sought review of a visa denial for her alien hus-
band. After discussing cases in which standing has been permitted, the
court held that "[i]f would-be employers of aliens may [seek relief], it
does not seem improper to confer a similar right of standing on an
134. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
135. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1970).
136. For a discussion of the question of standing under the Administrative Procedure
Act, see generally Note, supra note 41, at 1151-55.
137. 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
138. Id. at 760.
139. See, e.g., Digital, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir. 1974); Secre-
tary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
140. 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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aggrieved spouse."'1 4 1 The draft statute agrees with this contention and
recognizes the rights of blood relatives within predetermined lines of
consanguinity to possess standing to represent an alien's interest.
A third class of persons to whom standing would seemingly be
granted under the draft statute is defined as those who suffer analo-
gous injuries in fact as family members and employers. Potentially,
this category includes persons who filed affidavits or placed bonds on
behalf of an applicant or individuals through whom a visa candidate
has sought non-quota or preference status. 42 This category must re-
ceive broad interpretation while also satisfying the constitutional pa-
rameters of standing.
L4 3
5. Writs for review would most appropriately be brought directly
in the United States courts of appeals. 44 A concern over inundating
these courts, however, leaves district courts as a more suitable forum.
In the alternative, the District of Columbia would be the most logical
setting for these determinations, but again, to avoid overburdening this
court, the situs of plaintiff's residence or business shall determine
venue.
In addition to standing, jurisdiction represents another controver-
sial legal question confronted by those arguing for consular review
within the status quo.
With the adoption of this draft statute, the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction would no longer pose a problem. The absence of specific
statutory authorization to undertake judicial review of consular actions
has been repeatedly cited by courts as the reason for not indepen-
dently providing such relief. In Hsieh v. Kiley,14 5 the court held:
The jurisdiction of federal courts to review the Immigration
and Naturalization Services action in conducting or completing
an investigation requested by some other branch of the govern-
ment, such as the State Department, would similarly depend
on the existence of a statutory authorization or mandate from
Congress. No such authorization is shown or appears to
exist. 4"
141. Id. at 1184.
142. See House Hearings, supra note 85, at 1836 (statement of Henry Heineman).
143. Cf. Chinese American Civic Council v. Attorney General, 396 F. Supp. 1250
(D.D.C. 1975) in which a refugee sponsorship organization was denied standing because
it failed to allege "concrete injury to itself or to its members." Id. at 1252.
144. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 169.
145. 569 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1978).
146. Id. at 1181. The Hsieh court similarly added that "the Administrative Procedure
Act does not provide subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 1182.
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The enactment of this statute, however, ensures the existence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
Questions concerning personal jurisdiction over the defendant
would similarly be eliminated. Although it is unresolved whether con-
sular officers themselves are amenable to jurisdiction,1 4 7 personal juris-
diction clearly can be obtained over the Secretary of State. 14s Consis-
tent with past precedent which recognizes that "the real party in
interest in such suits is the Government,"'' 4  this arrangement is espe-
cially convenient under the statute since it is from the final internal
appeal to the State Department that a writ for review is filed. Conse-
quently, the problem of jurisdiction will be circumvented by adoption
of the statute.
6. To avoid the extensive delays that often burden civil suits in
federal court, expedited review has been adopted. 5 ' Notions of speed
and finality are essential when dealing with consular review. A writ for
review shall thus be modbled after a petition for habeas corpus, in that
it shall receive prompt presentation and examination by the district
court.'
7. The granting of visas remains the primary responsibility of
consular officers. Judicial relief is provided for exceptional cases only,
where legal and equitable principles have been misapplied. This appel-
late avenue is limited to one review to enhance the objective of finality.
8. To ensure meaningful, efficacious review, the district court
must have access to the complete record of the consular decision. Ini-
tially, the court is to receive all materials upon which a visa determina-
tion has been rendered. Since consular agents are presently required to
provide a statement of their reasons for a visa denial, 152 this presents
no unique hardship. The consular statement alone, however, is inade-
quate. 53 Applicants must be permitted to submit all information they
consider relevant via affidavits and notorized documents. Additionally,
the party representing an applicant before the district court (e.g. coun-
147. See Note, supra note 41, at 1150-51 n.100.
148. See, e.g., Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 897 (1976); Lukasyuk v. Haig, 523 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Grullen v.
Kissinger, 417 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
149. Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1961).
150. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 170.
151. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts,
Rule 4 (Feb. 1, 1976).
152. 22 C.F.R. § 41.130(b) (1983) (review of refusals at consular offices).
153. Recall that one of the most prominent shortcomings of the present system of
internal relief is the paltry record upon which review is based. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 66, 78.
1984]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
sel, relative or employer) shall be able to present additional affidavits
and testimony. 1 4 Finally, if the court is unable to resolve the legal con-
troversy, the consular officer may be requested to answer written ques-
tions, and in extreme cases respond to depositions.1 55 These procedures
should be more than sufficient to generate a record upon which a com-
petent review can be formulated. The very existence of this opportu-
nity for review should create a climate conducive to more thorough
fact-finding and complete record-keeping by consular officers. That in-
formation, coupled with an applicant's input, should result in an ac-
ceptable chronicle of the circumstances necessary for judicial
resolution.
9. In consonance with standard appellate practice, findings of
fact are not to be relitigated before the district court. Only questions
concerning the misapplication of law and the concept of fundamental
fairness are to be heard and considered. Under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act many complex legal questions arise in the contem-
plation of candidate admissibility. The ultimate resolution of such con-
siderations should remain with legal authorities.
10. Following the completion of judicial review, the court will: (a)
affirm the determination of the consular agent as upheld by the inter-
nal review, or (b) reverse the decision as contravening legal and equita-
ble principles. The latter conclusion shall be followed by an order of
the consul office demanding prompt issuance of the visa. Cases shall
not be remanded for further factual finding; sufficient procedures are
available for adequate discovery of the necessary facts prior to the ap-
pellate decision.
11. Visa applications may presently be rejected for any one of
thirty-three reasons.5 6 Many of these justifications are subject to the
whim and caprice of a consular officer and, therefore, give rise to the
need for judicial review. Several, though, are purely factual determina-
tions, most notably, quantitative limitations upon the number of per-
missible immigrants.1 57 Decisions to reject a visa applicant based upon
purely factual grounds shall not be subject to review. The writ for judi-
cial review is to remain an exceptional remedy for legal questions. Its
availability for all denials, even those based on incontrovertible statis-
tics, could lead to frivolous filing of writs.
12. This draft enactment alters the general thrust of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act in only one limited aspect. It institu-
154. See House Hearings, supra note 85, at 1583 (statements of Louis L. Jaffe and
Henry Hart).
155. See Note, supra note 41, at 1164 n.206.
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (1982).
157. Id. § 1182(a)(21).
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tionalizes an opportunity for judicial review in very select circum-
stances. Those provisions that are inconsistent with this intent are
hereby superceded unless they can be given effect in conjunction with
the new legislation. The remainder of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act retains its full legal force.
CONCLUSION
Consular officers perform an important international function by
issuing visas to candidates for immigration. This responsibility has
been undertaken by American consuls since 1924 and is one of the
most time consuming tasks of consular employees. More importantly,
though, such decisions possess considerable impact. The rejection of a
visa application terminates an alien's ability to enter the United
States.
Curiously, in spite of the contrary legislative history of the earliest
United States immigration enactments, a system of nonreviewability of
these significant consular decisions has become entrenched. When an
application is rejected, no effective opportunity for appeal exists. Cer-
tain administrative procedures have been implemented that permit
aliens in limited circumstances to receive a further examination of
their credentials. No actual statutory protection has been achieved,
however, and a total absence of judicial review persists.
Since the potential consequences of this problem are so detrimen-
tal and its cure relatively painless, immediate action is warranted. An
institutionalized system of judicial review based upon the proposed
draft legislation should be adopted for those aliens whose visa applica-
tions are rejected. This statutory solution would not only enhance and
develop the just application of United States immigration laws, but
would also guard against the subjective circumvention of the present
standards of admissibility. In the absence of a compelling opposing ra-
tionale, the acceptance of judicial scrutiny for consular visa decisions
should be made a reality.
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